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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper critically assesses some of the micro- and macro-economic reasons for 
using Public Finance Initiative (PFI) types of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and how a 
lack of transparency may result in an ‘illusion’ of making optimal, rational decisions related to 
them. A series of balances that decision makers need to make in order to choose whether or 
not to use PPPs are set out, as well as 15 potential ‘illusions’ that may affect such decisions. 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper synthesizes public evidence and develops a 
framework for the analysis of PPPs. 
Findings: A wide range of factors influence the choice of PPPs, including: budget 
enlargement; efficiency and value for money; certainty of expenditure and delivery; flexibility; 
financing costs; risk sharing; procurement process and transaction costs; legacy and public 
assets; and the wider impacts on the local economy. However, reasons why PPPs can 
provide improved infrastructure and services may not be realised due to in-built incentives, 
behavioural biases and implementation shortcomings. Necessary support for PPPs includes 
strong, robust and transparent regulatory and governance systems, the dissemination of 
good practice to all partners, consideration of alternative funding models and high quality 
advice and training.  
Research implications: The paper sets out a number of reasons for using PPPs, but also 
assesses potential drawbacks and identifies areas where greater research is required. A 
number of potential ‘illusions’ are identified, whereby decisions may be affected by factors 
not explicitly or transparently considered, hence giving the decision an ‘illusion’ being rational. 
Practical implications: PPPs are significantly influenced by the socio-economic, legal, 
legislative and financial system they are embedded in. A clear process for approving projects 
and recognising all the costs and benefits of PPPs is needed, including developing criteria 
and instruments to measure each phase of a PPP and its overall value added to the 
economy and society over its lifetime. Full transparency, having suitable support and 
explicitly taking account of potential ‘illusions’ affecting decisions could lead to different 
decisions, including the decision not to progress the project or to use alternative funding and 
development methods.  
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Social implications: Decisions on PPPs should be based on a clear and transparent long-
term basis which includes the perspectives of the full range of stakeholders to help improve 
the appropriate operation and social sustainability of a PPP. 
Originality/value: The paper sets out some key arguments for and against the used of PPPs 
in different circumstances, including why non-optimal decisions may be made.   
Keywords: Public Private Partnerships, PPP, Private Finance Initiative, PFI, rational 
decisions 
Type of Paper: Research paper 
 
Introduction 
Public Finance Initiative (PFI) types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a 
relatively popular way of providing public infrastructure and services across the world, and 
their use is supported by many international and national bodies (e.g. European Commission, 
2012; OECD, 2012a, b; UN, 2011; World Bank, 2015; Bull, 2010). PPPs can be used to help 
provide services as well as the infrastructure, but the consequences of doing so need careful 
consideration. Major reasons cited for using PFI-types of PPPs include: introducing greater 
innovation, efficiency and effectiveness (mainly through introducing private sector techniques 
and inputs and greater competition) and enlarging public budgets in the short-term by 
bringing in private financing. Other broad reasons for the greater use of PPPs include: 
changing perceptions of the role of the public sector from being a provider of infrastructure 
and services to being an enabler and, usually, funder of them; using outcomes as measures 
of public service provision success rather than outputs or inputs measures; and shifting some 
public budgets towards the private sector. 
Although PPPs have been used for millennia, in recent decades the UK has been seen as 
one of the major early adopters of PFI type PPPs1. This is where the private sector funds 
upfront costs in return for a long-term payment, accounting for around 10% of public 
infrastructure (OECD, 2014, p.14). The use of PPPs has declined in the UK in recent years, 
arguably due to improved transparency, questions about value for money, inflexibility, 
austerity and changing accounting standards removing an accounting advantage of PPPs in 
terms of them now counting as part of the national debt. This means that the high payments 
for existing PPPs will gradually decline until around 2028-9, and afterwards decline more 
rapidly until around 2050 (HM Treasury, 2016a, b).  
                                            
1 The term PPP can also be used for more voluntary, less contractually, based ‘partnerships’, which 
are more concerned with a partnership between stakeholders. For example the ILO (2008, p.1, 
building on UN, 2001) describe them as ‘voluntary and collaborative relationships among various 
actors in both public (State) and private (non-State) sectors, in which all participants agree to work 
together to achieve a common goal or undertake specific tasks. Partnerships may serve various 
purposes, including advancing a cause, to implement normative standards or codes of conduct, or to 
share and coordinate resources and expertise’. However, while these are very important (McQuaid, 
2000, 2010), the current paper only focuses upon PFI-type PPPs. 
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Internationally, based on a variety of sources, Inderst (2016) estimate that total global 
volumes of PPPs have been around US$60-$100 billion in recent years (about 0.1% of GDP). 
Across much of Europe (especially Italy, UK and France and Turkey) (EPEC, 2018), and in 
North America there has be considerable infrastructure provision and services based PPPs 
although Asia is well below the global average.  
The use of PPPs may also be influenced to some degree by bringing concepts from New 
Public Management (NPM) into public sector management (McQuaid, 2010). Although NPM 
may be in decline (Dunleavy et al., 2006), it remains to be seen if new forms of public and 
network governance influence future PPPs. Under PFI-type PPPs, the public sector still has 
democratic accountability and responsibility for defining the service (or infrastructure 
characteristics) and choosing between the objectives, therefore seeking to ensure that the 
wider public interest is taken fully into account (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010, p.29). It also 
decides on monitoring and standards of delivery, with performance measures, with 
effectiveness usually measured in terms of outputs, service quality measures, efficiency, 
financial performance and process and activity measures (OECD, 2008). 
When considering the introduction of PPPs to social services, there is a need to recognise 
the increasing complexity of services and infrastructure and the changing nature of public 
services. These include the multi-dimensional set of factors that affect service users and the 
services they need, such as individuals’ health, housing, childcare, local demand, social 
networks as well as skills, etc. Hence often a multi-agency &/or multi-service response, with 
a range of resources and expertise, is required. This leads to questions of how best to co-
ordinate them? Are PPPs likely to be more or less efficient and effective in the long-term? In 
addition many welfare services are concentrated among disadvantaged groups and areas – 
so how locally and community responsive are PPPs likely to be? With increasing, persistent 
demands for social services (e.g. demographic change leading to more requirements for 
services for the elderly), some argue that many countries are moving from a welfare state 
towards a welfare services state, where many services will no longer be provided primarily by 
the state (e.g. Bifulco, 2016). If so, is co-ordination of services carried out through intra-
PPP/consortium mechanisms by contractual PPPs more efficient and effective than other 
forms of public-private intra-organisation co-ordination or by public provision, and what types 
of PPPs may or may not be appropriate for providing such services? Are contractual PFI-
type PPP relationship better than other forms of delivery or partnership (e.g. with NGOs)?  
The answers are likely to depend on specific services or infrastructure, circumstances, types 
of partnership and types of partners. However, in seeking to shed light on these questions, 
there is often an assumption of rationality underpinning decisions on PPPs. As argued below 
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many decisions on PPPs may in practice be subject to factors that can lead to deviations 
from rational choices2. Hence, while the reasons for choosing PPPs may seem rational, the 
actual basis of the choice may be influenced by various non-rational factors and ‘illusions’. 
The remainder of the paper presents a brief outline of PPP definitions and then goes on to 
assess various arguments for the use of PPPs, and how and why some of these may not be 
realised. These broad overlapping factors are discussed in terms of: budget enlargement; 
efficiency and value for money; certainty of expenditure and delivery; flexibility; financing 
costs; risk sharing; procurement process and transaction costs; legacy and public assets; 
and the wider impacts of PPP on the local economy. The paper then briefly considers a 
series of balances that a decision maker needs to make in order to choose whether or not to 
use PPPs, especially services based ones, and if so what type of PPP to use. Some 15 
‘illusions’ are summarised before the conclusions are presented. 
 
Definitions of PPP 
There is no universal definition of PPPs (examples include: Hodge and Greve, 2013; OECD, 
2008, pp.15-17; UN, 2011). There are several definitions used by international organisations 
related to contractual, PFI-type, PPPs. The OECD (2014) states that:  
‘Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are long term contractual arrangements between 
the government and a private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public 
services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks.’ 
Services are explicitly included in the World Bank’s (2014) definition of a PPP as a:  
‘long-term contract between a private party and a government agency, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and 
management responsibility’ (World Bank, 2014, p.17). 
Similarly the European Commission’s (2004) Green paper on PPPs terms them:  
‘forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business which aim 
to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance of an 
infrastructure or the provision of a service’. 
Contractual PPPs involve: the private provision of infrastructure and/or services that are 
usually provided by the public sector for the common good, and therefore involve some 
continued public sector involvement; mainly private sector investment, but usually funded 
                                            
2 Rational choices are considered here to be where a decision-maker accurately evaluates the optimal 
outcome between choices, given the information available (see Eisenführ, et al., 2010). 
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over the long term by the public sector (or sometimes also by users); the sharing of 
substantial risks (financial, technological and operation) related to the project’s design, build, 
operation or financing; long-term projects and contracts; and are output rather than input 
focused (see for example, Malone, 2005).  
 
Reasons for the choice of PPPs and associated ‘illusions’ 
The choice of whether to use a PPP (instead of other options such as the more traditional 
public financing mechanisms), and if so which type of PPP to use, is based on a range of 
factors. Major arguments for the use of PPPs often relate to micro-economic issues as they 
are seen to: increase innovation, effectiveness and efficiency when providing public 
infrastructure and services; increase choice and quality of public services; and improve the 
equality of social services between different geographical areas (such as urban-rural) (see 
for example: Thieriot and Dominguez, 2015; NHS Executive, 2004). PPPs also present more 
macro-economic opportunities for governments to access greater private finance and to 
‘spend today and pay tomorrow’ (so-called ‘budget enlargement’). They can also provide 
opportunities for private and NGO bodies to access major new income streams and markets, 
formerly reserved for public sector providers (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). The European 
Commission (2004) identified four main private sector roles in PPPs, the first about access to 
finance, and the others generally about improving delivery: providing additional capital; 
providing alternative skills in management and implementation; adding value to both the 
consumer and the general public; and identifying needs and the optimal use of resources.  
Given these broad potential arguments in favour of using PPPs, there are a number of critical 
success factors which increase the likelihood of all parties having a positive outcome. These 
should influence the types and characteristics of PPPs chosen and how they are 
implemented and include: managing risks effectively; providing services or infrastructure of 
appropriate quality that fully meets specifications on time; reliable and high quality service 
provision; effective partnership working and long-term relations; value for money; efficient 
contracting and procurement processes; and (for the private sector) profitable provision (e.g. 
Martin et al., 2013; Osei-Kyei et al., 2017). In addition, for welfare and other services 
especially, incorporating the views and needs of service users and local communities, as well 
as other stakeholders, is crucial. The paper now discusses the various potential reasons for 
the use of PPPs in service and infrastructure provision. 
Budget Enlargement 
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PPPs have often been presented as a means of enlarging the effective public sector budget 
over the short-term (e.g. UNECE, 2008, 2012; McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010), through 
keeping much of the capital costs of PPPs ‘off balance sheet’ (e.g. not showing the full extent 
of the liability for the capital expenditure or commitment in the government accounts). The 
OECD (2011) found that this was more important than value for money in some countries, 
while the Dutch Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB), (2013) found that most 
PPPs were for budget enlargement (additional financial mobilisation) reasons rather than for 
improved effectiveness. This tends to be more important for projects that are primarily about 
physical infrastructure provision, but can affect services where there is a need for 
considerable capital outlay (e.g. for new or modified premises or equipment). 
International accounting standards have changed in the last decade, so more expenditure 
must be shown ‘on balance sheet’, particularly where there is only a limited transfer of risk 
(McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010; House of Lords, 2010). The effects of these standards (e.g. 
Financial Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB), 2007) are sometimes unclear as they may 
depend on the exact interpretation by national and international bodies. If their rules are fully 
applied then this should lead to PPPs being compared more accurately to other procurement 
methods. Interestingly, a potential change from the former UK PFI to the revised Private 
Finance 2 (PF2) system is that the public sector no longer paid for the project’s capital costs 
over the construction period, but rather over the life of the project (HM Treasury, 2016b). This 
may mean that costs are spread out over a longer period than under previous regulations, 
requiring them to be included when paid, which may support suggestions that previous 
methods of accounting were influenced by budget enlargement. In the UK, the National Audit 
Office (2018, p. 10) stated that most PFI debt is scored as ‘off-balance sheet’ for national 
account purposes, under the European system of accounts (ESA) that determines 
government debt levels, while according to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), which are used to produce government financial accounts, most PFI debt is ‘on-
balance sheet’. 
Budget enlargement is especially attractive when there are major infrastructure needs. PPPs 
can allow official public debt to be kept lower than under ‘traditional’ procurement, and so 
improve the government’s position in international financial markets, or to meet debt limits on 
public borrowing. In addition, overall tax burdens in the medium term might be reduced if 
PPPs are more cost-effective than traditional public procurement. However, the reverse is 
possible if the PPPs are less efficient overall in practice. The evidence on the effects of PPPs 
on public finances is mixed (Hodge and Greve, 2007). If previously sheltered sectors 
undergo deregulation and economic structural change, then PPPs may raise efficiency 
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(McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010, p.30). However, private borrowing costs are almost invariably 
higher than those of the public sector and there are usually high fees (perhaps 1-2% of total 
PPP/PFI payments) (National Audit Office, 2018). So the efficiency gains from PPPs need to 
at least compensate for the extra financial and transaction costs that they incur, otherwise 
the budget financing leads to a ‘fiscal illusion’ where the financial burden of PPPs is spread 
out over many years and is not seen immediately in public budgets. Therefore, it is essential 
that PPPs are adequately monitored and the true levels of risk, capital and revenue liabilities 
are shown in a way consistent with international accounting standards. Without clear and 
transparent public accounts for PPPs, it is difficult to determine if PPPs increase or decrease 
the long-term tax and debt burden.  
Budget enlargement may also occur during the implementation of a PPP. For instance, PPPs 
have sometimes been used to realise the value of land or other assets (e.g. where public 
land is part of the PPP ‘package’) and so raise public expenditure. Some UK local authorities 
have generated land value by building schools on Greenbelt land and houses on former 
school sites (so allowing high housing land values to be realised). Planning permission might 
not have been given to building houses directly on the Greenbelt but would be given for a 
school, so this might mean that local planning regulations could potentially be influenced by 
the PPP (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010). 
Efficiency and value for money 
Micro-economic PPP factors focus on the potential for improving the efficiency, effectiveness 
and value for money of projects. It may do this through the introduction of new (largely 
private sector) skills and practices, incentives and innovation, together with potential 
economies of scale and scope, and more efficient utilisation of assets and ‘cradle-to-grave’ 
or whole life asset management (European Commission, 2004; NHS Executive, 2004; HM 
Treasury, 2000, 2008; World Bank, 2009).  
A further reason for improved efficiency is the introduction of greater competition for, and the 
contestability of, the PPP. However, experience suggests that sometimes competition in 
PPPs can been limited, partly as economies of scale may limit competition to larger firms, 
technical and financial resources may restrict the numbers of firms able to bid, and PPPs are 
usually put forward by consortia (hence several potential competitors may be working 
together, reducing competition overall). PPPs generally have low numbers of bidders, 
therefore reducing the real level of competition and its potential benefits, due in part to the 
monopolistic-type or oligopolistic behaviour by the firms. In addition, under ‘traditional’ 
procurement there is often considerable competition (e.g. when tenders are requested to 
build, or design and build, infrastructure). In this way, the specific benefits of PPPs are 
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affected by the way in which competition is introduced. However, compared to a purely public 
sector delivered project, rather than traditional procurement using outside (non-public sector) 
contractors, there is likely to be greater competition.  
Hoppe et al. (2010) suggest that, while PPP type contracts should have greater incentives for 
cost reductions than using a single contractor, quality might go up or down. Current public 
operations may include additional services that are not explicitly set out in the contract – and 
so these will no longer be provided by the PPP. It is useful if such extra services (e.g. special 
treatment for those with disabilities) are made explicit and so are properly funded; in practice, 
however, this may not be the case.  
Factors that may negatively affect PPP development and implementation include differing 
value and ethical systems of the public and private sector actors (OECD, 2008), poor design 
of contracts and inappropriate risk sharing, and a lack of accountability (Pollock et al., 2007; 
Pollock and Price, 2013). In terms of value for money, Barlow et al. (2013) argue that results 
for healthcare PPPs in the European Union, across different forms of financing and PPPs, 
have been mixed, and accommodation only PPPs (e.g. building and maintaining hospitals) 
have not seen the expected cost savings. The National Audit Office (2018) and Treasury 
Committee Treasury Committee (2011, p. 48) found, respectively, that efficiencies often 
failed to materialise with, for instance, schools costing 40% higher than if funded by 
government borrowings and hospitals 70% more expensive that the public sector comparator. 
Meanwhile, Torchia et al. (2015) found that while PPPs have been used to address 
internationally emerging public health issues, their effectiveness, efficiency and convenience 
are unclear.  
The balance between partners is important for achieving value for money. The basic legal 
framework, including state laws, influences the degree of favour towards the private sector 
partners, and this appears to be affected by economic and political circumstances, such as 
general economic growth, congestion and need for infrastructure and political composition in 
the legislature (see Geddes and Wagner, 2013, for US examples). 
In the early UK PFI/PPPs, there were a number of cases of excessive, windfall profits for 
private partners and hence reduced public income. The UK House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee (2011, p.3) review argued that PFIs (Private Finance Initiative types of 
PPP) had been a better deal for private investors than the taxpayer. Similarly, there was a 
UK review of PFI in 2012 with changes made to the PFI model so as to improve 
transparency, value for money and partnership working (PF2) (HM Treasury, 2012; National 
Audit Office, 2009; Reynaers and Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015).  
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Hence, the OECD (2012a) and others argue strongly for clear consideration of value for 
money in PPPs. The IoB (2013) found that evaluations tended to focus on resource sharing, 
while the issues of risk sharing and revenue distribution in PPPs received little attention in 
half of the selected studies. Most goals were quite general (e.g. improved co-ordination) and 
few were output specific. Although most of the small number of PPPs reviewed had positive 
outputs, it was usually unclear if these were attributable to the PPP, and most evaluations 
were not particularly robust scientifically (e.g. scoring lowly on the Maryland Scale of 
Scientific Methods). Therefore, the conclusion is clear – few PPP evaluations were based on 
rigorous and robust impact analysis, and the case for the value for money of PPPs is 
uncertain– an ‘evaluation illusion’. 
Certainty of expenditure and delivery 
In general, public sector expenditure flows have greater certainty under PPPs. This is partly 
due to costs (with an added inflation element) generally being agreed over the entire life of 
the project, with the developer usually taking the risk of cost overruns or increased costs 
above some agreed level, or of lower income than expected.  
However, there may be considerable difficulties in changing a PPP contract after it is signed 
(e.g. specifications or design features are difficult to change, while views on how services 
should be delivered also change over time). Other types of procurement (such as ‘traditional’ 
public borrowing and managed methods) may incorporate greater temptation and scope for 
the project’s public sector commissioner to change specifications at a late stage or during its 
development, often incurring large additional costs. PPPs usually therefore introduce greater 
discipline to the public sector, although this discipline could be achieved through better 
project planning, procurement and management among project commissioners after signing 
the initial contract. 
PPPs may also restrict the decision maker’s ability to alter or merge infrastructure as these 
are set out for decades in the contract. An example is if a group of social service facilities 
(e.g. schools) are to be amalgamated. The PPP funded ones are likely to be kept open if 
circumstances change as it is harder and more expensive to close them, even if it would 
have been preferred to have kept the non-PPP facilities open instead. This can lead to the 
potential inefficient location of services in the long-term. So there may be an ‘illusion of 
flexibility’ with PFI-type PPPs. 
There are normally strong incentives for the private partner to complete PPP projects on time, 
as added costs or delay penalties can be incorporated into the contract. In some cases 
payments may not start until after completion of construction, giving incentives especially 
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where the developer has high initial financing costs. The agreement of, for instance, a design 
and build PPP may include streamlined land assembly, planning and other agreements, so 
reducing potential delays. Overall this can lead to shorter and more certain construction 
times, but other forms of procurement could also achieve them with effective planning and 
management. 
The maintenance of the public infrastructure (e.g. school buildings, roads, etc.) has often 
been poor, and PPPs can offer some certainty that there will be adequate maintenance. This 
is partly as reduced maintenance of public infrastructure is often perceived as short-term 
‘savings’, while ignoring the higher long-term costs due to the need for major, costly 
reconstruction later. PPPs can help reduce the risk of poor maintenance due to such short-
term public sector decisions, perhaps influenced by an election cycle, as they normally 
include maintaining the infrastructure at a specified level over its life. So even if budgets 
come under pressure elsewhere the public sector commissioner is contractually obliged to 
pay the PPP, so they cannot cut maintenance. However, there are alternatives, other than 
PPPs, for keeping required levels of maintenance, such as taking long-term contracts or ring 
fencing budgets for it. 
Flexibility or ‘Lock-in’ 
Circumstances and partnerships are likely to change over time, so PPPs need to respond 
and this may require continued trust building and adaptation to changing local or wider 
circumstances (Bloomfield, 2006). The lack of flexibility after a contract starts is a major 
problem with PPPs. For instance, if a hospital is built then it may not be easy to include 
changes to issues including information technology (such as better internet provision, new 
processes for delivering services, etc.); opportunities or requirements for changing 
infrastructure standards (e.g. the need for greater energy efficiency or the addition of 
alternative energy sources such as solar panels); or changing the way of organising work 
(which may require changes to the physical structure of the building), etc. Therefore, the 
project may suffer from being ‘locked-in’ to a particular technological and organisational 
approach for many years, or the PPP contract may need to be renegotiated – another 
example of the ‘flexibility illusion’.  
External changes may also affect the PPP. In the case of the Skye Bridge PPP, changes to 
European Union legislation on tax (VAT) for toll bridges forced the renegotiation of the 
original contract (McQuaid and Greig, 2007). An increase in tax affected the demand for the 
facility and therefore the income of the project and the costs of the PPP. 
Financing costs 
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In general the capital and financing costs of PFI-type PPPs are likely to be higher than public 
sector borrowings. So even with efficiency savings, PPPs may cost more than ‘traditional’ 
procurement (see above). The rate of return expected on different types of PPP projects 
varies (e.g. schools versus toll roads) (OECD, 2014). When estimating the rate of return 
expected by private sector capital, financial indicators of PPP performance, particularly 
Internal Rate of Returns (IRR), are often used. However, these may be misleading (HM 
Treasury, 2013), except where related payment streams are flat, like an annuity.  
Cuthbertson and Cuthbertson (2012) found this assumption of flat payment streams was 
rarely met, based on data on actual PFI-type PPPs, so the opportunity cost to the public 
sector and the potential scope for profit by the private sector were both understated – i.e. 
there may be a ‘rate of return illusion’. They suggested that outstanding debt may be a more 
reliable indicator of how much the annuity type payment assumptions are bent. Hence great 
care is needed in estimating the actual return on PPPs. 
Overall, PPPs lack transparent monitoring (often due to the ‘hidden’, non-transparent and 
non-public nature of the contracts), as well as lacking transparency in their a priori evaluation 
– i.e. they suffer from a ‘transparency illusion’. Evaluations often include physical monitoring 
(e.g. the meeting of building codes or standards), but should also include multi-level financial 
monitoring at project, public body (such as local authority) and national levels. It is important 
that full information on project contracts, and the financial models used by the public sector, 
are publicly available (and developers told of this requirement before bids are called for). 
Risk sharing 
A key aspect of PFI-type PPPs is the transfer and sharing of endogenous (controlled by the 
partners) or exogenous (beyond control of the partners) risk between the public and private 
sectors, so the party that is best able to is the one to bear the risk. These may include 
construction, operation, inflation, technological and demand risks. Exogenous risks are 
usually assumed by the public sector or shared (with the private sector partner getting a 
premium related to their share of the risk) (see OECD, 2008). 
However, there will be pressure on the public sector to stop the private partners or the 
project from failing or going bankrupt, especially where the project is politically or 
economically ‘sensitive’, so more of the real risk is likely to rest with the public sector – 
leading to a ‘risk of failure illusion’. The public sector may have to take back control of the 
operation at short notice, or find another provider or renegotiate the contact, all possibly at 
high cost. An example is the UK government having to be involved when a large firm, 
Carillion, went into liquidation early in 2018, with contracts covering many sensitive public 
service areas, including hospitals, maintaining Ministry of Defence housing, and school 
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dinners (House of Commons, 2018; House of Commons Library, 2018; National Audit Office, 
2018). 
A further technological risk is that as PPPs are long-term contracts, these can tie the project 
to a specific type of technology, therefore reducing future flexibility (a further ‘flexibility 
illusion’). It can also make it more difficult to introduce more modern technologies, leading to 
potentially costly re-negotiations, unless the contracts are carefully constructed and build in 
necessary flexibility.  
 
Procurement process and transaction costs 
There are a number of potential problems with PPP procurement. In general, the costs of 
developing PPP contracts are likely to be greater than under ‘traditional’ procurement due to 
their complexity and long-term nature leading to higher transaction costs as mentioned 
above. These transaction costs are mostly fixed; they therefore increase the minimum 
efficient sizes of PPPs and favour larger organisations with their economies of scale or scope. 
There may be information asymmetries between the public partners (especially small local 
public bodies) and the private sector (particularly large experienced private firms), which can 
be exploited by the private partners in the contract or in negotiations on PPP projects. Over 
time, the public sector may also lose their expertise in the delivery of services going to PPPs 
and therefore suffer from further expertise and information gaps, especially in services where 
outputs are difficult to measure. Together these information asymmetries and varying levels 
of expertise can lead to an ‘expertise illusion’ where the public sector overestimate or fail to 
value their expertise. 
While some of the procurement costs are transferred to the PPP in terms of the private 
sector bidders developing their own solutions to meet the requirements of the PPPs, the 
complexity of projects over their life cycles may lead to poor protection of the public interest 
(Da Cruz and Marques, 2012). PPPs may even lead to a reduction in protection of public 
resources due to over-specified procurement procedures (Verhoest et al., 2016), although 
the standardisation of PPP contracts can improve the procurement process (van den Hurk 
and Verhoest, 2016). Establishing dedicated PPP units in government (OECD, 2010) may 
sometimes help alleviate these problems. However, in a study of 19 European countries, van 
den Hurk et al. (2016) found that support agencies for PPPs varied considerably in practice 
(they distinguished four categories from sceptical systems of zero support to fully organised 
PPP systems). Also some PPP support agencies may have difficulties in assessing 
alternative funding models, depending on their expertise, remit and external pressures.  
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The procurement of PPPs can also include systematic cognitive and social biases amongst 
the public sector actors commissioning PPPs and their partners, which may lead to non-
rational decisions. The impacts of social and cognitive biases, as well risk preference and 
time biases, is an area that would benefit from further research. A few examples of relevant 
behavioural biases, or ‘behavioural illusions’ include:  
 hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Laibson, 1997) resulting in a preference for immediate 
payoffs compared to greater longer-term pay-offs, which is a fundamental aspect of 
budget enlargement PPP activity;  
 optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2007) may be present in many PPPs where the positives 
are given greater weight than potential negatives;  
 anchoring biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) where one characteristic of the 
project (e.g. the published opening date) is overly focused upon even if it negatively 
affects other aspects of the project (such as long-term costs);  
 ‘availability cascade’ (Kuran and Sunstein, 1999) where a collective belief (such as 
the perceived efficiency of the private sector) is self-reinforced by repetition in public 
discourse (which arguably affected attitudes towards PFI-type PPPs for many years);  
 framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) where different decisions are made 
depending on whether the effects are presented as a positive rather than a cost (e.g. 
focusing on “the project would be opened next year and the cost per year is small” 
rather than “the total cost over the lifetime is higher than with other forms of delivery”).   
These potential biases raise a number of issues with decision-making on PFI-type PPPs. 
First, they illustrate that, even if there is a clear rational objective for entering a PPP, the 
actual decisions may not be fully rational, but rather subject to many behavioural biases, 
influences or ‘behavioural illusions’, hence perhaps only giving the 'illusion' of decisions 
being 'hard-nosed' or fully rational. Second, decisions are made in a wider societal, economic 
and institutional context, so focusing only on the decision process of the individual 
organisation or person ignores the influences of other actors (personal as well as 
professional) on that decision. So we should not consider the decision makers as individual 
atoms, but rather molecules of tightly linked relationships within a wider compound or 
solution of loosely linked, for example, institutional and socio-economic relationships. 
Behavioural analysis hence, could benefit from being more integrated with relationship 
perspectives and forms of analysis, such as social network analysis. Third, there may be 
different objectives, or rationalities for decisions, underlying a PPP actor’s decisions, for 
instance a firm entering a PPP may be influenced not just by commercial logics or 
motivations, but also other social factors. Similarly, different stakeholders (public and 
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community ones for example, as well as private sector stakeholders) may have various 
combinations of motivations and rationalities for their decisions, and these may change over 
time.  
One way of widening perspectives on thinking about PPPs before they are commissioned is 
to have greater involvement of the public and future users of the services. Boyer et al. (2016) 
argue that, empirically, public involvement can improve the wider support for PPPs and the 
adaptation of project design to local conditions. However, generally the public participation 
processes do not appear to have much influence on the delivery of the project or imbalances 
of power between public and private sectors.  
Legacy and public assets 
The legacy after a PPP ends, as well the operation of the PPP, should be considered. As 
public sector officials are often not directly involved in providing a service within a PPP, PPPs 
may reduce the public sector’s ability to learn the lessons from providing the service. This 
may affect the development of future policy, and their ability to learn from past experience, 
therefore leading to possible repetitions of previous mistakes due to a lack of corporate 
‘memory’. Local community, public and SME knowledge may also be lost if large external 
firms develop and deliver most of the PPP. Therefore, mechanisms are needed to ensure 
that such knowledge continues to be accessible to the relevant public sector bodies and 
others to avoid a ‘legacy illusion’ where future implications of PPP decisions are not 
adequately considered. 
The issue of the handing over a service or building after the end of the PPP is important. If a 
contract states that the infrastructure is handed back to the public sector at the same 
standard after 30 years, it is important to explicitly state if this handing over is to be at the 
original building standards (e.g. in terms of energy efficiency, structural standards, IT, etc.) or 
at the standards current at the date when handed over. If the former then what is being 
handed over may be a totally out of date structure or service.  
Wider impacts of PPP on the local economy 
PPPs may assist in developing the capabilities of SMEs and larger firms in the local private 
sector, as they learn from joint ventures with larger national or international firms, as well as 
promote regional innovation (Kristensen et al., 2014). Potential also exists for gaining sub-
contracts (e.g. services provision or facilities management). However, most PPPs are large, 
especially when projects are ‘bundled’ together in a package. Therefore, only lower level 
contracts or service provision may be available to smaller local companies and they may 
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have to deal with PPP main contractors who maintain considerable market power, limiting 
technology transfer and restricting development – resulting from a ‘big is beautiful illusion’. 
In addition, negative impacts can affect the public good as a consequence of reducing the 
risks for a PPP. For instance, where the public sector agrees not to build or improve 
potentially competing roads near a PPP toll road (Plewik, 2000), this can lead to a degree of 
monopoly power for the PPP and hinder future economic development of the region. 
 
Services PPP, a series of balances 
In addition to the many factors discussed above, when delivering services a decision maker 
needs to balance a series of factors in order to choose whether or not to use PFI-type PPPs, 
and if so what type of PPP to use. Some of these balances (in addition to factors such as risk, 
cost, specifications etc.) are now illustrated. These include:  
Quality of services (which are usually hard to measure) versus efficiencies (which are often 
an issue for Government and users given increasing demographic and other demands on 
their resources). Care must be taken to avoid a ‘quality illusion’ where the quality is assumed 
to be as good as or better than before, but without adequate in-depth monitoring. 
Efficiencies may be achieved by cutting wages and conditions of workers (sometimes due to 
reduced Trades Unions influence or other weakening in employee bargaining positions), 
which gives an ‘illusion of efficiency’ rather than comparing genuine productivity due to 
reducing salaries or other costs rather than increasing output per hour or quality etc. 
Economies of scale and scope versus diseconomies scale (e.g. if provision is less 
responsive to local demand due to corporate policies of the private operators or public 
commissioning agency) – an ‘economies of scale illusion’. 
Innovation versus restricted innovation and competition due to monopoly or oligopoly power 
(if there is limited genuine competition, due for instance to minimum PPP size conditions 
preventing smaller competition) – a ‘competition illusion’. 
Roles of service users and local communities in the development, which will be important for 
the appropriate operation of the services and the social sustainability of the project versus 
control by the main PPP funders and operators.  Care needs to be taken to avoid token 
involvement of these stakeholders in major decisions and the on-going operation of the PPP 
– an ‘involvement illusion’. 
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Hence, there is no definitive type of PPP when considering a services based PFI-type PPP. 
Rather the decisions should be made on a clear and transparent long-term basis which 
includes the perspectives of the full range of stakeholders and which includes the socio-
economic impacts and distributional and equity issues associated with using PPPs and with 
different forms of PPPs or other forms of service provision. 
 
 
Summary of ‘illusions’ related to rational choices in PPPs 
This paper has set out some of the major factors that are important when considering the use 
of contract based, PFI-type PPPs. There are many arguments in favour of well-designed 
PPPs. However, when making decisions on PPPs great care must be taken to avoid a 
number of issues whereby the choices give the ‘illusion’ being rational, but are instead 
affected by other factors that are not explicit or transparent. Some of these ‘illusions of 
rational’ PPP decisions are shown in Table 1, divided into the broad, overlapping areas of 
development and operation factors, decision-making and long-term impacts. 
In total, 15 illustrative potential ‘illusions’ that may affect PPP decisions are as follows: 
Development and operation ‘illusions’ 
‘Fiscal illusion’ where the efficiency gains from PPPs do not compensate for the extra 
financial, transaction and other costs that they incur; or budget enlargment. 
‘Rate of return illusion’ where the rate of return calculation is inappropriate, (e.g. the use of 
Internal Rate of Returns (IRR) may be misleading, where related payment streams are not 
flat). 
‘Risk of failure illusion’ where the distribution of the full risks are not explicitly recognised, 
(e.g. a PPP is prevented from going bankrupt or is replaced by additional public funding, as 
the service is essential or ‘politically sensitive’). 
‘Flexibility illusion’ where PPPs restrict future choices (e.g. closing non-PPP schools rather 
than PPP ones, as costs of the latter must continue to be paid rather than deciding on the 
basis of need; or ‘lock-in’ to a particular technological and organisational approach due to the 
introduction of new technology not in the original PPP contract etc.). 
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 ‘Quality illusion’ where the quality (especially of social services PPPs) is assumed to be as 
good as or better than before, but without adequate in-depth evidence or monitoring. 
‘Efficiency illusion’ where apparent increases in efficiency are mainly due to, for example, 
lower pay and conditions of staff and not due to greater quality and/or output per hour. 
‘Competition illusion’ where limited real competition results in monopoly or oligopoly power 
for PPP bidders and contractors. 
‘Economies of scale illusion’ where diseconomies of scale are ignored and only the positive 
economies of scale or scope are considered. 
 
Decision-making ‘illusions’ 
‘Evaluation illusion’ where ex-post evaluations are not rigorous or robust enough to give 
accurate findings. Also in a prori evaluations where the comparators for the PPP are 
artificially constrained (e.g. by not including the best reasonable or practical alternative). 
‘Transparency illusion’ where there is a lack of public transparency about information on the 
procurement and on-going monitoring of the PPP, so making it impossible to fully judge their 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
 ‘Expertise illusion’ where the public PPP procurement agencies lack sufficient expertise, or 
have inadequate information, compared to the other PPP partners with whom they are 
negotiating. 
‘Behavioural illusions’ where systematic cognitive and social biases amongst those 
commissioning PPPs and their partners, lead to non-rational decisions, (e.g. those identified 
in behavioural science such as social and cognitive biases, risk preference and time biases). 
 
Long-term impact ‘illusions’ 
‘Legacy illusion’ where inadequate consideration is given to the indirect, long-term 
implications of transferring functions to PPPs, (e.g. there may be a loss of institutional 
memory or expertise in the commissioning bodies and where future increases in standards of 
infrastructure or service provision are not fully incorporated in the PPP). 
  18  
 ‘Big is beautiful illusion’ where the full, long-term effects on SMEs and the local economy of 
using large PPP contractors are not fully taken into account. 
‘Involvement illusion’ where key stakeholders, such as service users and local communities, 
are given no or only token involvement in major decisions on the development and on-going 
operation of the PPP, so there is a lack of meaningful input from them. 
Of course, many of these influences or negative effects can be minimised, but not entirely 
removed, by well-constructed PPP contracts. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has illustrated that decisions about the development and operation of PPPs can 
be affected by factors that are not explicitly or transparently considered, hence sometimes 
giving the decision an ‘illusion’ of being rational. The paper set out a series of such potential 
‘illusions’ that should be clearly taken into account when considering the use or choice of 
PPPs. Some fifteen of these ‘illusions of rational’ PPP decisions were considered and divided 
into the broad, overlapping groups related to development and operation factors, decision-
making and long-term impacts. Removing such ‘illusions’ may make some PPPs less 
attractive, from an economic and perhaps political perspective, but result in improvements for 
those that are agreed. 
PPPs are significantly influenced by the socio-economic, legal, legislative and financial 
system they are embedded in. Hence a clear process for approving projects and recognising 
all the costs and benefits of a PPP is needed, including developing criteria and instruments 
to measure each phase of a PPP and its overall value added to the economy and society 
over its lifetime. A clear a priori and on-going evaluation process for deciding on PPPs needs 
to be used and alternatives fully compared, so as to identify the option most appropriate and 
offering best value for money over the entire lifespan of the infrastructure or service. Greater 
consideration should be given to significantly improving PPP procurement processes, and 
also to alternative forms of financing and developing projects, including ‘traditional’ methods. 
Despite the potential problems of PFI-type PPPs, they may be worthwhile if properly 
assessed and managed. In addition other forms of PPP will remain crucial for innovative, 
efficient and efficient public service delivery. 
All PPPs and their evaluation processes should be transparently and rigorously monitored – 
at project, public agency, regional and national levels. This should be public and transparent, 
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as there is large scope for excessive profits or use of monopoly power where there is limited 
effective competition among providers. If PPPs are chosen as the most effective and efficient 
method for a project, then it is essential that there is expertise to support for the procurer of 
the infrastructure and/or services both nationally and at regional/local levels and in specific 
industrial sectors. The relevant stakeholders, including the local communities and service 
users, should also be fully involved at all stages of a PPP development and operation. 
Full transparency, having suitable support and explicitly taking account of potential ‘illusions’ 
affecting apparent rational decisions could lead to different decisions, including the decision 
not to progress the project or to use alternative funding and development methods. This is 
also important when attempting to achieve genuine innovation and the effective and efficient 
provision of infrastructure and services through PFI-type PPPs or by other methods.  
Finally, research is needed into the socio-political-economic factors underlying the rise of 
PFI-type PPPs and how they were influenced by political factors, including governments 
wishing to spend today and tax tomorrow, economic considerations, and other factors such 
as lobbying by financial and other vested interests. In summary, while there are potential 
advantages of PFI-type PPPs in some cases, it is crucial that previous mistakes are avoided 
and that a transparent and robust system of support is available to those considering or 
evaluating the use of PPPs, and that alternatives are fairly considered. It remains to be seen 
what new types of PPPs might be consistent with long-term efficient, effective and 
accountable services and infrastructure provision in an era of pressure on resources and 
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